We provide a complete proof of the security of quantum cryptography against any eavesdropping attack including coherent measurements even in the presence of noise. Polarization-based cryptographic schemes are shown to be equivalent to EPR-based schemes. We also show that the performance of a noisy channel approaches that of a noiseless one as the error rate tends to zero. (i.e., the secrecy capacity C s (ǫ) → C s (0) as ǫ → 0.) One implication of our results is that one can double the efficiency of a most well-known quantum cryptographic scheme proposed by Bennett and Brassard simply by assigning vastly different probabilities to the two conjugate bases. 
I. INTRODUCTION
Cryptography is the art of providing secure communication over insecure (i.e., subject to eavesdropping) communication channels. The security of a conventional cryptosystem often lies on a relatively short secret value known as the key that has to be agreed on by the two legitimate users before secure communication can be started. For this reason, secure key distribution is a crucial issue in cryptography. Unfortunately, classical cryptography provides no tools to guarantee the security of the key distribution because classical signals are vulnerable to passive interception: A passive wiretapper can simply make copies (clones) of the carrier of information and read off from those copies the value of the key. Since the original carrier of information can be resent to the legitimate user without alteration, there is no way for the two users to check whether the carrier has been intercepted.
In quantum mechanics, any measurement that does not disturb a complete set of nonorthogonal states also fails to yield any information distinguishing them [1] . (See Appendix for a proof.) In particular, it is impossible for the eavesdropper to clone non-orthogonal states. Therefore, coding based on non-orthogonal states can be used to detect any eavesdropping attempt [2] . The feasibility of secure quantum key distribution over long distance by optical fiber has been recently demonstrated: A prototype system at BT laboratories is capable of key transfer over 10 km in optical fiber at date rates of 20 kbit s −1 [3] . The investigation on the foundations of quantum cryptography is thus timely.
Noise is inevitable in any real communication channel. It is, therefore, crucial to demonstrate the security of quantum cryptography when the communication channel is noisy.
Various eavesdropping strategies have been investigated in the literature [4] . In order to acquire any appreciable amount of information about the transmitted signals, they are all shown to introduce a substantial change in the error rate. Therefore, quantum cryptography is generally conjectured to be secure. Unfortunately, it has not yet been ruled out that still more sophisticated use of quantum physics might defeat quantum cryptography 1 .
This is hardly a comforting situation: In the long history of classical cryptography, there were numerous instances of unexpected failures of cryptographic schemes (e.g., the knapsack scheme) that were once believed to be unbreakable. Such failures often led to dramatic and even disastrous consequences. To ensure that quantum cryptography does not follow the same trail, it is, therefore, essential for us to establish rigorously its absolute security. The first goal of this paper is to give such a proof.
The most general eavesdropping strategy available to an eavesdropper, traditionally called Eve, is for her to coherently manipulate all the transmitted particles [5] by coupling them as a single entity with a probe (an ancilla). Eve may subsequently perform measurements on the ancilla to acquire information about the transmission. In Section II, we prove the security of quantum cryptography in a noisy channel by showing that it is unbreakable even by coherent manipulations performed by the eavesdropper.
After establishing the security of quantum cryptography, we come to the next question:
how much information can be securely transmitted through a noisy quantum communication channel? Both eavesdropping and the intrinsic noise of the system introduce errors (including decoherence) in the channel and it is often difficult to distinguish between the two sources.
Therefore, a conservative user may assume that all the errors are due to the wiretapping.
Since wiretapping in a quantum channel necessarily leads to errors in the transmission, the legitimate users can put an upper bound to the extent of wiretapping by determining the error rate of the channel. Standard techniques such as error-correcting codes and privacy amplification can then be applied to the partly secret raw signals to distill a shorter but absolutely secure sequence of bits which can then be used as the key for subsequent classical 1 Deutsch et al. [5] have suggested a purification scheme in which the two legitimate users perform coherent manipulations on the transmitted particles. Such a scheme is asymptotically unconditionally safe against any attack. Unfortunately, its efficiency is very limited.
communication. An insecure but unjammable (i.e., subject to wiretapping but not alteration of messages) classical channel can be used for the public discussion between the two users during the distillation process.
The maximal number of secure bits that can be distilled from each raw signal transmitted through a quantum channel is clearly a function of the error rate. It is defined as the secrecy capacity [6] of the quantum channel. The second goal of this paper is to find out the properties of this function.
However, we face two problems in our investigation. The first difficulty is that, unlike classical information theory [7] which is a mature field, a quantum theory of information is still being developed. For example, despite much past effort, a most basic problem in quantum information theory-the classical information-carrying capacity of non-orthogonal quantum signals-is still generally unsolved [8] . Our inability to answer this basic question makes the issue of secrecy capacity even more intractable. The second problem is the fact that, even within the context of classical information theory, no simple expression has been found for the secrecy capacity in general [6] . Only lower and upper bounds have been obtained. Going to the quantum regime will almost certainly not make things any easier.
Despite these two difficulties, we shall see in this paper that much about the secrecy capacity can still be learned.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section II, we introduce a simple spherical symmetric EPR-based cryptographic scheme as a toy model and establish its security against eavesdropping even in the presence of noise. By deriving a lower bound to its security capacity, we demonstrate that as the error rate tends to zero, the performance of such a noisy quantum channel approaches that of a noiseless one. In Section III, we generalize our toy model results to more realistic cryptographic schemes. First, the assumption of spherical symmetry can be relaxed and any choice of two or more non-orthogonal measurement bases suffices to guarantee the security of an EPR-based scheme (provided that the error rate is sufficiently small). Second, we show that polarization based cryptographic schemes are conceptually equivalent to EPR-based schemes. Hence, the proof of the security of quantum cryptography and the discussion about secrecy capacity for our toy model trivially carry over to polarization based schemes. One interesting implication of our results is that one can essentially double the efficiency of a most well known cryptographic scheme proposed by Bennett and Brassard simply by assigning vastly different probabilities to the two conjugate bases.
II. COHERENT MEASUREMENTS
In this Section, we shall establish the security of the following cryptographic scheme for the m test pairs. If the error rate is found to be unreasonably large, they assume that eavesdropping has occurred. Thus, they should reject the whole run and go through the procedure again. Otherwise, they assume that no successful eavesdropping attempt has been made. Now they share the remaining N − m bits which may well be corrupted by the noise and Eve's wiretapping attempt. So, the hope is that, at sufficiently small error rates, Alice and Bob can use well-known schemes of error correction and privacy amplification to distill out a shorter key of absolute security against Eve's attack.
The question that we would like to answer is the following: For a noisy quantum communication channel, will Eve be able to obtain a large amount of the information shared between
Alice and Bob without exposing her eavesdropping attempt by coherently interacting the N transmitted particles with an ancilla? This is in fact the most general eavesdropping strategy.
Before going into the question of coherent manipulation, let us consider a single EPR pair.
The Hilbert space of an EPR pair is spanned by the singlet |ψ 0 and the three other states |ψ 1 , |ψ 2 , and |ψ 3 . Only the singlet state is guaranteed to give the desirable antiparallel result for the measurement along any axis chosen by Alice and Bob. For a noisy channel, the output will generally be a mixed state which may be described by a density matrix M.
One can define the fidelity as F = ψ 0 |M|ψ 0 [9] . It is the probability of the mixed state for passing a test for being a singlet state. (Thus, 0 ≤ F ≤ 1). Being so, it is invariant under simultaneous rotations of the two particles. Given an ensemble of identical pairs each described by M, one can estimate its fidelity by the following process. For each pair, Alice picks a random axis to measure the spin of a member of the pair. Bob performs a similar measurement along the same axis on the other member. Notice that for a given mixed state of an EPR pair described by M and a random axis of measurement chosen by Alice, the probability that Alice and Bob's measurements give antiparallel results is (1 + 2F )/3.
The physical reason is simple. If the two members of the i-th pair are measured along the z-axis and found to be antiparallel, a state in the subspace spanned by the singlet state and (|10 z + |01 z )/ √ 2 is consistent with this result but those in orthogonal complement of this subspace are not. If they are measured along the x-axis instead, an antiparallel result will only be consistent with a state in the subspace spanned by the singlet and (
but not with a state in its orthogonal complement. As we are considering a random axis, there is spherical symmetry. Since only one of the three non-singlet states will give an antiparallel result, we have
this means that when an EPR pair is in a non-singlet state, there is a probability of 2/3 of failing to give an antiparallel result. As discussed before, Alice and Bob estimate the error rate of the channel by publicly announcing the results of their measurements for m pairs. For a communication channel with a small error rate, it would therefore be unwise for
Eve to cheat by substituting non-singlet EPR pairs into the communication channel. Any amount of substitution with the number of non-singlets higher than 3/2 of the original error rate of the channel is highly likely to lead to an abnormally high error rate in the m test bits and consequently detection by Alice and Bob. The curious fact is that, in what follows this simple observation will play a crucial role in our argument for the case of coherent manipulation.
A. Security of our EPR Based Scheme
To prove the security of the above EPR based scheme, first note that the most favorable scenario for an eavesdropper Eve would be to allow her to prepare the states for the N EPR pairs. Any (more realistic) situation will involve environmental noises and can be regarded as a special case in which Eve does not utilize the full control she has on the EPR states.
The most general state that Eve can prepare is of the form What about a noisy channel? Suppose, based on previous communication experience, Alice and Bob know that the actual channel error rate in the absence of eavesdropping is ǫ.
(Except for Subsection III D, we will only be interested in the regime ǫ ≪ 1 in this paper.)
They again draw m pairs randomly from the N transmitted pairs. We assume m ≪ N but m is still large enough for an accurate estimation of the error rate. The key observation is that most basis vectors in Eq. (1) are highly unlikely to give an error rate in this region. Even if we are generous enough to extend the acceptable error range to [0, (ǫ + cǫ 2 )m], our conclusion does not change. Consider a vector of the form
Since the measurement axes are chosen randomly for the m test samples, such a state on average gives a parallel (i.e., incorrect) result for 2ma/3 pairs which is much larger than the maximal tolerable number (ǫ + cǫ 2 )m for say a ≥ 2ǫ > ǫ + cǫ 2 . Since we assume ǫ ≪ 1, most of the basis vectors in Eq. (1) contain far more than 2Nǫ non-singlet states in a tensor product decomposition with respect to each particle and tend to give abnormally high error rates. Therefore, inspired by Shannon [10] , we divide up the Hilbert space of the N pairs into a 'typical' subspace and its orthogonal complement, an 'atypical' subspace. A typical subspace is one whose states have exponentially small probabilities to give an acceptable error rate [7] . Here comes another important observation: the atypical subspace has a small dimension (as compared to 2 N , the dimension which gives the N classical bit of information shared between Alice and Bob). To be more precise, one can give the following generous bound to the dimension of the atypical subspace
where k is a positive constant, µ a small number of order log N/N, and
] is the entropy function. Note that the inequality [7] 
and the concavity of H(x) have been used in the third and the fourth lines of Eq. (2) respectively. For our purposes, Eq. (2) is good enough because 2 −N kǫ log 2 ǫ is clearly exponentially smaller than 2 N , the dimension that gives N bits of information. Nonetheless, we remark on passing that a much more refined bound could be found.
Suppose Eve prepare the state
for the combined system of 2N particles and ancilla. Alice and Bob will only accept a run of N pairs if m randomly chosen samples give a reasonable error rate. If we average over all the random axes, the probability of passing such a test
where f (m) the minimal exponential suppression factor for vectors in the typical subspace to pass such a test [7] . Notice that f (m) → ∞ as m → ∞. Thus, the contribution from the typical subspace is bounded above by exp (−f (m)) which goes to 0 as m → ∞.
B. Eve's Dilemma
Now the dilemma that Eve faces is clear. In order to have even just an exponentially small probability exp (−f (m)/2) of passing the sample testing, the contribution from the atypical subspace must exponentially dominate that from the typical subspace. Without much loss of generality, one can assume that the whole typical space simply drops out whenever the testing of the m samples is passed. Therefore, effectively, the dimension of the Hilbert space is reduced to that of the atypical space. But the atypical subspace has a small number of dimension and is incapable of giving Eve much information.
In case the above discussion is still not transparent, in this paragraph, we show how this selection effect comes about in more detail. Let us specify the measurement axes for the m test samples. An outcome is the results (up or down) of the 2m measurements made by Alice and Bob. Suppose the initial state of the combined ancilla-particles system is given by |u 0 . According to the conventional interpretation of quantum mechanics, if a measurement gives a outcome j (a state |v j for the m test pairs), the state of the system will be projected onto |j = (|v j v j | ⊗ 1 1 other ) |u 0 . where 1 1 other is the identity operator for the other degrees of freedom (i.e., the N − m remaining pairs and the ancilla). The probability p j of this outcome j occuring is given by i |( v j | r i |) |u 0 | 2 where r i | denotes the state of the other degrees of freedom and the sum is over a complete basis. Since Alice and Bob will reject all measurement results with abnormally high error rates, most outcomes j will be rejected.
Under the assumption that the m samples pass the test, the state of the combined system after the test will be described by a density matrix
where the sums are over those outcomes that pass the test. The crucial insight is, however, that all basis vectors are not created equal. As noted before, if we consider a tensor product state of n non-singlets and N − n singlets, under arbitrary and independent rotations of all pairs, it will transform into a linear superposition of states that are also made of n nonsinglets and N − n singlets. (Here, particles in the same pair are only allowed to be rotated by the same amount because we are only interested in measurements that are done along the same axis on the two members of a pair.) The likelihood of a state in passing the test depends on n. Vectors in the typical space have a large n and are exponentially unlikely (as a function of m) to pass the test while those in atypical space may fare better. Therefore, any realistic chance of passing the test is due to the atypical space (which consists of vectors of small n). This selection effect effectively eliminates the whole typical space from our consideration.
Moreover, the atypical space has a small dimension 2 −N kǫ log ǫ as given by Eq. (2). An upper bound on the amount of information that Eve can acquire by measuring the ancilla is given by the Holevo's theorem [11] :
where
is the reduced density matrix for the ancilla given that the m samples pass the test. We obtain an upper bound
where θ is a small correction term coming form the typical space. Asymptotically, θ can be made as small as one is pleased by taking m → ∞.
Eve may well have some a priori information about the measurements. The point is that the probability of getting an "up" in Alice's (or Bob's) measurement may well depend on the orientation of the axis chosen. The probability that the spin measurements by Alice and Bob are antiparallel can also have such an orientation dependence. Thus, the mutual information shared by Alice and Bob may actually be smaller than N bits. Nevertheless, any correction term must be of the order −Nǫ log ǫ. For sufficiently small error rate ǫ, the secrecy capacity C s of the channel (per EPR pair) therefore satisfies
where k ′ is some constant. Notice that as the fidelity F → 1, ǫ → 0 and C s → 1. Therefore, an arbitrarily small error rate implies a secrecy capacity arbitrarily close to the ideal channel capacity (which is one bit per EPR pair). Notice that Eve can still mess up the results of say O(log N) pairs without worrying about being detected because the portion of pairs tested m/N → 0. However, this has no effect on the secrecy capacity. What we have shown is that any attempt to obtain O(N) bits of information will be almost surely detected.
What is the principle underlying the security of an EPR-based cryptographic scheme?
Ekert [12] suggested that it comes Bell's theorem. However, Bennett, Brassard and Mermin [1] later proved the security of EPR-based schemes without invoking the Bell's theorem.
Nevertheless, both works only addressed noiseless channels. Here, we would like to propose an alternative viewpoint which remains useful even for noisy channels. From an informationtheoretic point of view, the security of an EPR-based quantum cryptographic scheme can be traced back to the observation that in quantum physics, knowing completely the state of a composite system does not guarantee complete knowledge of the states of the individual constituents because of the presence of entanglement entropy. For instance, the entropy of each member of a perfect EPR pair is non-zero even though the total entropy of the pair is zero. Consequently, two observers are able to use an EPR pair to transmit a random but secret bit of classical information. Heuristically, in the presence of noise, we expect that transmission of secret information is still possible as long as the "entanglement entropy"
remains larger than the entropy of the composite system. As in the case of EPR based schemes, they can then choose a subset of those measurements that are done in the same bases and compare the results in public. From the error rate of the m test samples, they can estimate the error rate for the whole run and hence the degree of eavesdropping. They can then decide whether to accept the run or to reject the run and do it again.
As argued by Bennett, Brassard and Mermin [1] , the two classes of schemes (EPR based and polarization based) are conceptually equivalent. The point is that Alice could have prepared each photon by producing an EPR pair of photons and measuring one member along a random axes (rectilinear or diagonal), letting the other particle, now in a known random one of the four states, pass to Bob. We remark that this argument remains valid even for a noisy channel.
There is still, however, one minor difference. So far we have assumed that, after the transmission of the N EPR pairs, Alice informs Bob of her basis of measurement for her particle in each pair and Bob is supposed to measure the spin of the corresponding partner along the same basis. It is of course experimentally difficult for Bob to store up a large number of photons to wait for Alice's announcement of her bases. Allowing Alice and Bob to choose between the two bases (rectilinear and diagonal) independently as in the BB84 scheme is definitely more realistic. Is this going to affect our conclusions?
The answer is no. Recall that all we need in our proof is to use a small subset of the EPR pair to estimate the error rate when the axes Alice and Bob used do agree. Whether the axes for other measurements agree or not is irrelevant. Our proof of security of EPR based cryptography, therefore, automatically implies the security of polarization based schemes even if Alice and Bob choose their measurement axes independently.
There are two alternative points of view regarding the underlying principles governing the security of quantum cryptography. The first and more well publicized point of view, which has been discussed in Section I, is that measurements performed on non-orthogonal states in quantum mechanics generally lead to disturbance. For a noiseless channel, it leads to the generalized "no-cloning" theorem (see the Appendix). In our opinion, the trade-off between information gain and disturbance by an eavesdropper in a noisy channel remains to be studied in more detail. The second point of view, which has been discussed in the last paragraph of Section II, is that the security of quantum cryptography lies on the possibility in quantum mechanics of the "entanglement entropy" between two subsystems being larger than the entropy of the whole system. The equivalence between EPR and polarization based schemes suggests that these two alternative points of view are in fact equivalent.
B. Doubling Efficiency in BB84
In the BB84 scheme, Alice and Bob choose their measurement axes from two conjugate bases (rectilinear and diagonal) independently and with equal probability. A drawback of such a scheme is the reduction of the ideal secrecy capacity to half of the optimal value (i.e., 1/2 bit per pair vs 1 bit per pair because only half of time will the two independently chosen bases by Alice and Bob agree). However, we would like to remark that the restriction of equal probability in choosing the two bases is totally redundant. Conceptually, the probability of choosing the rectilinear basis can be made much larger than the probability for the diagonal basis. At small error rates, this will lead to a secrecy capacity which is almost double of the original BB84 scheme.
More explicitly, given a noisy channel with error rate ǫ ≪ 1. Suppose they choose the rectilinear and diagonal bases with probabilities 1 − ω and ω respectively (where ω ≪ 1).
For the transmission of N photons, there are on average Nω 2 photons for which both Alice and Bob measure along the diagonal basis. They can for example publicly compare their measurement results for those Nω 2 photons. In addition, they also randomly choose Nω 2 photons from the set for which they both measure along the rectilinear axis. They can decide that the error rate is acceptable if and only if it is less than 2ǫ. Now given any ω ≪ 1, there exists an N 0 such that, for the transmission of N > N 0 photons, any eavesdropping attempt to get more than O(−Nǫ log ǫ) bits of information about the state of the transmitted particles will almost surely be detected. Thus, this scheme with different probabilities for the two bases is clearly secure. Furthermore, it has the benefit that, in the limit ω → 0, we obtain essentially double of the efficiency of the scheme proposed by Bennett and Brassard. It is of practical interest to investigate whether this observation will lead to the design of more efficient protocols for say quantum oblivious transfer and quantum bit commitment [15] .
C. Other Generalizations
Of course, in practical applications, the quantum signals used in BB84 are low-intensity light pulses rather than ideal single photon pulses. In that case, we must consider the possibility of beamsplitting attack. We shall, however, pursue this problem no further in this paper.
There are other protocols of polarization based cryptographic schemes. For instance, two rather than four non-orthogonal quantum states are used in a scheme proposed by Bennett [16] . We believe that the techniques developed in this paper can be used to prove the security of this kind of schemes as well.
D. Properties of Secrecy Capacity
Let us return to the subject of secrecy capacity. The EPR scheme introduced in Section II is designed to be spherical symmetric so that the problem can be characterized by just one parameter, namely the fidelity or the error rate. This is why the secrecy capacity is a function of one variable. In a more general setting, more than one parameters may be needed for the characterization of the noise level of a quantum communication channel. Consequently, the secrecy capacity will be a function of multiple variables. As far as the legitimate users are concerned, the output of a communication channel is related to the input by a superscattering matrix. The goal of the users is to choose their inputs so as to maximize the information of the output and minimize the information leakage to the environment at the same time.
E. Conclusions
We have proved that an EPR based quantum cryptographic scheme is secure against coherent measurements by eavesdroppers. Our proof relies on the law of large number.
The dimension of the space of states that are consistent with a small rate is exponentially smaller than the dimension of the whole Hilbert space, Thus, by testing the error rate for a small subset of signals, one can effectively eliminate most dimensions. Consequently, an eavesdropper is unable to get much information. Moreover, we prove that a polarization based cryptographic scheme is conceptually equivalent to an EPR based scheme. Our proof of the security of quantum cryptography therefore carries over to the former. The secrecy capacity of a quantum channel is also investigated.
On a conceptual level, our work suggests that the two alternative points of view (namely (1) the "no-cloning" theorem for non-orthogonal quantum states and (2) that the entanglement entropy between subsystems being larger than the entropy of the whole system) concerning the principles underlying the security of quantum cryptography are in fact equivalent. One practical implication of our results is that one can double the efficiency of the cryptographic scheme proposed by Bennett and Brassard [14] (BB84) simply by assigning vastly different probabilities to the two conjugate bases. Finally, we remark that the beamsplitting attack remains to be addressed in future investigations.
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APPENDIX: GENERALIZED QUANTUM "NO-CLONING" THEOREM
Suppose we are given a particle that can be in either one of the two non-orthogonal states, |u 1 or |u 2 of a two-dimensional Hilbert space. Here, we prove that it is impossible to obtain information distinguishing between the two possibilities without perturbing its state. A simple proof goes as follows. An eavesdropper may generally couple an ancilla in the state |Ψ to the particle and evolve the combined system. To avoid detection, the final state of the signal has to remain unchanged. Now suppose U (|u i |Ψ ) = |u i |Φ i . Since U is unitary,
Since u 1 |u 2 = 0, it follows that Φ 1 |Φ 2 = 1. Thus, |Φ 1 = |Φ 2 and no information can be obtained.
